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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—ORIGINAL EXPLICATION: A
DEMOCRATIC MODEL FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF
MODERN STATE CONSTITUTIONS*
JORGE M. FARINACCI-FERNÓS†
INTRODUCTION
This Article proposes a model of constitutional interpretation for U.S.
state courts that takes into account the authoritative adoption history of
their respective state constitutions, particularly those that were adopted in
the twentieth century and were the result of a highly democratic, public,
participatory, popular, and socially transcendental process of creation.
From a methodological perspective, I offer the model of original
explication. This method has already been implemented in foreign
countries like Bolivia,1 and U.S. jurisdictions like Puerto Rico.2 U.S.
states that adopted constitutions through similar processes should follow
their lead. Other countries can also jump in.

*

This Article was presented at the 4th Annual Constitutional Law Scholars Forum
organized by Barry University School of Law and Texas A&M University School of Law in
Orlando, Florida on March 1, 2019. This Article is partially based on several chapters of the
author’s S.J.D. Dissertation, Original Explication and Post-Liberal Constitutionalism: The
Role of Intent and History in the Judicial Enforcement of Teleological Constitutions,
Georgetown University Law Center (2017). The author would like to thank his research
assistant, Zoé Negrón Comas, for all her incredible help and contributions.
† B.A. & M.A. (University of Puerto Rico-Río Piedras), J.D. (University of Puerto Rico
Law School), LL.M. (Harvard Law School), S.J.D. (Georgetown University Law Center).
Assistant Professor of Law, Interamerican University of Puerto Rico Law School.
1. See generally Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, When Social History Becomes a Constitution:
The Bolivian Post-Liberal Experiment and the Central Role of History and Intent in
Constitutional Adjudication, 47 SW. L. REV. 137 (2017).
2. See generally Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, Originalism in Puerto Rico: Original
Explication and its Relation with Clear Text, Broad Purpose and Progressive Policy, 85 REV.
JURIDICA U. INTER. P.R. 203 (2016).
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Like Bolivia and Puerto Rico, many U.S. state courts that are charged
with implementing their respective modern constitutions are at a
crossroads. On the one hand, these constitutions are very different from
their federal counterpart,3 particularly as to the process of their creation
and their substantive content. However, many state courts simply adopt
the currently available methods of interpretation, which were designed
with the particular circumstances of the federal Constitution in mind, thus
ignoring the normative force of their respective adoption histories and the
substantive content they produced.
This Article wishes to start a deliberate and conscious conversation
about how to go about helping state courts adopt a method of
constitutional interpretation that takes into account both the substantive
content and, more importantly, the process of creation of their respective
constitutions.4 I believe original explication is the appropriate model for
state constitutions created through a highly democratic, public,
participatory, popular, and socially transcendental process of creation.
Since, as we will see, the reasons for adopting original explication
stem directly from the normative force generated by the constitutional
adoption process, I will first analyze the normative case for the adoption
of original explication and then turn to an in-depth analysis of its actual
content. For purposes of clarification, I will offer a brief summary of what
original explication is at the start, so we can immediately dive into its
normative justifications, which, in turn, determine the actual content of
the model itself. In other words, the why determines the how.
As such, this Article is divided into the following Parts: (I) this
Introduction; (II) a brief description of original explication; (III) the
normative justifications for the adoption of such a model in the context of
state constitutions that were adopted, mainly in the twentieth century,
through a highly democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially
transcendental process of creation; (IV) the relationship between creation
process and substantive content, and its impact on the task of judicial
interpretation and enforcement; (V) an in-depth description of the original
explication model itself; (VI) how original explication would be applied

3. I do not propose, and in fact would reject, the application of the original explication
model to the U.S. Constitution. As we will see, the main normative requirements for the use of
this model are: (1) a democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially transcendental
process of creation, and (2) an existing fidelity to the content of the original constitutional
project. From my point of view, both elements are completely missing in the federal context.
As such, original explication should only be applied to state constitutions that have these
normative elements.
4. See generally Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts about State Constitutional
Interpretation, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 837 (2011).
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in terms of the judicial enforcement of the type of substantive
constitutions these processes tend to generate, with an emphasis on its uses
of text, intent, purpose and, particularly, adoption history; and (VII) some
of the implications the adoption of this model can have in terms of
constitutional theory, as to the judicial enforcement of modern
constitutions. At the end, I offer some final thoughts.
I.

ORIGINAL EXPLICATION: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION

Normally, I would be inclined to start this Article with an in-depth,
descriptive analysis of the inner workings of the original explication
model and then turn to its normative justifications. But in this case, to do
that would be missing the mark completely. That is so because the
original explication model is the direct result of its normative
underpinnings. It is not meant to be, though conceptually it could, a standalone model. On the contrary, it can be argued that its existence is
premised on a particular historic experience: the nature of the process of
constitutional adoption. In other words, the process generates the method.
As previewed, I will first analyze these normative underpinnings and
then turn to the descriptive analysis of the model itself. But, in order to
avoid any unnecessary suspense or any possible confusion, I offer a brief
description of the original explication model, so as to give the reader a
better understanding of the overarching arguments.
Original explication is a method of interpretation and construction
that treats official adoption history, particularly the outwardly-uttered
expressions of the framers of a democratically-elected body during its
public deliberations, as authoritative both as to the communicative
meaning of the constitutional text, and as to its normative content.5 The
term “explication” refers to the different manifestations of the outwardlyuttered expressions of the framers, including, but not limited to, intent,
purpose, explanations, possible applications, communicative meaning,
legal effect, scope, and reach. As long as they were made publicly during
the official deliberations of the framing body, all of these utterances will
carry significant, and mostly authoritative, normative weight. As such,
explication treats the words uttered by the framers as the authoritative
source of constitutional meaning.
As a result, the main role of interpreters is to interpret those words
which, in turn, establish the authoritative meaning of the constitutional
text itself. In other words, the main source of constitutional meaning is
5. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 65 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95 (2010).

4

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1

not the text itself, but the explications of its framers during the deliberative
process. In terms of sources, this model gives particular weight to the
public, official, and formal records of the constitutional creation body.
II. THE NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ORIGINAL EXPLICATION
MODEL
Conceptually, original explication is neither inherent nor alien to any
system. It can be adopted by different types of constitutions, even though
they were not the result of a popular or democratic process of creation. At
the same time, it can be rejected by constitutions that were the result of a
transcendental social process. I argue in this Part that, as a relative matter,
there is a stronger normative case in favor of the latter adopting an
original explication model of constitutional interpretation and
construction, as opposed to the former. In other words, constitutions that
are the result of a highly democratic, public, popular, participatory, and
socially transcendental process of constitutional creation have a stronger
normative case in favor of adopting this model and against rejecting it. In
fact, as previewed, one could argue that the existence of this type of
process of creation is the antecedent event that gives birth to original
explication in the first place and justifies its use.
As such, the key to the original explication model is the nature of the
constitution-making process itself. As we will see shortly, when the
process is highly democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially
transcendental in nature, the stated purposes, goals, and reasons of the
framers that generated the text receive special importance, even more than
the text itself. In other words, the why behind the text is as important, if
not more important, than the text that was produced, precisely because of
the particular nature of its creation process. In these circumstances,
process generates and informs substance.
This requires an analysis of the constitutive parts of the type of
process to which I refer as they relate to the method of interpretation. As
previewed, original explication is the methodological result of
constitutional creation processes that were democratic, public,
participatory, popular, and socially transcendental. I will briefly address
each one of these elements individually, but only as it pertains to their
normative role in the interpretive process.6
6. For reasons of space, this Article will assume the existence of such a process and focus
exclusively on its relation to the actual operation of the original explication model. I am
currently working on a normative proposal as to that type of process titled: HOW
CONSTITUTIONS ARE INTERPRETED DEPENDS ON HOW THEY ARE CREATED: WHEN HISTORY
REQUIRES THE USE OF HISTORY IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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First, the public nature of these processes strengthens the case in favor
of giving substantial weight to the official public deliberations of the
framing body. This public characteristic is what gives original explication
its main normative force. As such, when democratically-legitimized
constitutional legislators publicly state their reasons, objectives,
intentions, and understandings of what the text they are adopting means
(both semantically and legally), and they do so during the public
deliberations of the constitution-making body, that exercise becomes
more important than the eventual make-up of the specific text. This is so
because the main normative force of the constitution stems from its
process and not its actual textual product.
For example, this phenomenon has a direct impact on the process of
identifying the semantic or communicative content of the constitutional
text. This model can be articulated both in terms of explication as a form
of public meaning or explication as the best evidence of meaning. In both
cases, the relevant intent is the one which is externally expressed during
the formal process of constitutional creation. This is so precisely because
the forum with the most political legitimacy is the public deliberations of
the constitutional body. As a result, the People accept that the constitution
means what the framers publicly told them it meant during the
deliberations of the constitutional body.
This leads us directly to the second element of the process—its
democratic nature. When the body charged with writing and adopting a
constitution has a strong democratic mandate, its deliberations become
part of that democratic process. As a result, what goes on during those
deliberations has irresistible normative force. Moreover, we must not
forget that the democratic nature of the process is not limited to the
deliberative body. It is also applicable to the antecedent stages. Those
stages also become part of the authoritative adoption history of the
constitutional creation process. The democratic nature of the process
elevates the framers from mere writers to legitimated representatives of a
self-constituted People. As such, when we focus on the framers, we do
not do it as individuals, but as agents of a broader democratic project.
The third element is participation. When the People are highly
engaged in the constitutional creation process, whether through the
election of the members of the deliberative body or the constant
interaction with that body during its deliberations, the People stop being
passive actors, waiting to see the product of the elected framing body, and
instead become the main driving engine of the entire project. As a result,
focusing on the deliberations of the framing body puts interpreters in the
same position as the sovereign People. As such, the deliberations of the
framing body are not an ordinary parliamentary experience, but an
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interactive process where People and framers merge. This adds to the
normative force of the framing body and its formal deliberations.
Fourth, we deal with the popular nature of the creation process. This
is closely related to the democratic nature of the constitution-making
process, and it refers to the level of substantive engagement by the People.
In other words, whether the constitution that is being drafted adequately
reflects the policy preferences of the public. When the constitution does
this, it becomes the People’s constitution. Again, this leads us to the issue
of legitimacy and normative force; in this case, as the result of popular
approval, not so much of the final text, but of the process that created it.
Finally, I address the socially transcendental character of the process.
By transcendental, I refer to those historical social processes that
constitute a turning point or milestone in any given political community
and that substantially redirect the development of that society. In these
instances, the chosen method of interpretation must take into account the
events of that pivotal social moment, particularly through the use of
formal adoption history. This is so because the body that adopts the
constitutions in these circumstances reflects the transcendental nature of
the historical process at hand.
In that sense, the main underlying premise behind the case for the
adoption of original explication in the case of modern state constitutions
is their process of creation. The democratic, popular, participatory,
socially transcendental, and above all, public nature of the process
strengthens the case in favor of explication as the crystallization of that
process in terms of legitimizing force, normative value, and significance.
This leads us to two final, but crucial, subjects. The first one has to
do with the basic normative justification of this model and the overarching
basis for original explication. I refer to the legitimacy of the formal
constitution-making process and its impact on interpretive methodology.
The second one involves one of the main objections to intent-based
methods of interpretation. I refer to how the sheer normative force of that
process washes away any objections as to the so-called “collective intent
problem.”
As to legitimacy, when a constitution-making process possesses the
above-identified qualities (democratic, public, participatory, popular, and
socially transcendental), the line between the representative body and the
People blurs significantly, even to the point of normative irrelevance. As
a result, the framing body assumes the role of the self-constituted People.
As such, its deliberations and expressions have the utmost normative
force. This legitimacy makes adoption history authoritative. When, on
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the contrary, the process lacks these elements, the normative force of the
framing body is severely reduced.7
As previewed, legitimacy leads to authority. These two elements
supply the main normative justification for any choice as to interpretive
methodology. For example, intent-based methods of interpretation can be
characterized as inappropriate if the framers of a constitution lack
legitimacy, and thus, authority. On the other hand, if the framers do, in
fact, possess legitimacy and authority, it would be inappropriate to reject
intent-based methods of interpretation.
This brings us to the so-called collective intent problem,8 which has
served as one of the main objections against the use of intent-based
methods of interpretation. In essence, the objection is based on the
physical impossibility of single-group thinking. When it comes to
legislative bodies, the objection goes, the only common link is the text that
is being approved. The reasons, motivations, purposes, and goals of the
framers are irrelevant because they can never transcend the individual
sphere and become collective, unless, of course, they are articulated as
text.
But the so-called collective intent problem is really more conceptual
than physical. From a normative standpoint, it doesn’t matter if collective
intent actually exists in the physical world. On the contrary, it is a legal
fiction, whose existence and usefulness depends solely on its normative
force. When this happens, the only empirical problem is the availability
of accurate sources. If accurate, the actual content of those sources is
accepted as an authoritative reflection of the collective intent of the
framing body.
I do not deny the physical problem of collective intent. But that
physical problem does not equal normative impossibility. Collective
intent, as a legal fiction, can exist if there are enough normative
justifications for it. In the case of creation processes that were democratic,
public, participatory, public, and social transcendental, this legal fiction
acquires great, and virtually unsurmountable, normative force. In these

7. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretative Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003); Larry G. Simon, The
Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation be Justified?, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1482 (1985).
8. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009); Thomas B.
Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 248 (2009); Stephen M.
Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28
B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 283, 295 (2014); John Manning, The Role of the Philadelphia Convention in
Constitutional Adjudication, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1753, 1760 (2012).
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situations, the political community accepts the legal fiction, thus freeing
its courts from the philosophical and conceptual quagmire.9 In other
words, if the People see the creation process as legitimate and
authoritative, then the framing body, not necessarily its individual
members, is believed to act as a single entity with a particular intent.
III. HOW THE PROCESS CREATES SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT
As we’ve seen, the main normative justification for the original
explication model is the process of constitutional creation. From a purely
conceptual point of view, democratic, public, participatory, popular, and
socially transcendental processes of creation can generate a wide variety
of constitutional types with differing content. But, from a historical
perspective, this type of process generally, though not inherently, results
in a particular type of constitution: a teleological constitution.10
The main characteristic of modern teleological constitutions is the
substantive nature of their content. That is, unlike the federal Constitution
whose main focus is setting up the structure or framework of government,
teleological constitutions focus on substantive policy issues, such as
economic organization, social relations, labor rights, and environmental
protection, among many others. As a result, the main objective of these
constitutions is to directly influence the development of a particular
society through the adoption of enforceable substantive policy preferences
in the constitutional text.
As previewed, the normative justification for the original explication
model lies primarily in the process of constitutional creation. Yet, because
the type of creation process that requires original explication also tends to
generate teleological constitutions, original explication becomes an
important tool in the adequate enforcement of the substantive content of
these constitutions as well. In that sense, original explication is the direct
result of both the creation process and the substantive content generated

9. See Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, Looking for the Correct Tool for the Job:
Methodological Models of Constitutional Interpretation and Adjudication, 52 REV. JURIDICA
U. INTER. P.R. 213, 245 (2018).
In constitutions that are the product of high-energy democratic politics, popular
mobilization and participation, social and historical transcendent moments, and are
also public in nature, the concept of collective intent becomes less controversial.
If the political community accepts, as a political choice, that a certain multimember body is authorized and legitimized to act on behalf of the people, their
intent is conceptually feasible, which is wholly separate from the empirical
issue . . . .
Id. (emphasis in original).
10. See Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, Post-Liberal Constitutionalism, 54 TULSA L. REV. 1,
32–37 (2018).
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by that process. As we have seen, in these circumstances, process tends
to be the overriding factor. However, we must not forget the substantive
content that comes out of this process. Original explication is designed to
fit with the type of substantive content that generally, though not
inherently, accompanies constitutions that were adopted through a
democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially transcendental
process of creation.
The relation between process and substance is twofold. First, that the
democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially transcendental
process of constitutional creation tends to adopt constitutions that contain
policy preferences in the text that will reflect the views of the social
majority. In that sense, these types of processes tend to generate
constitutions that, instead of being “neutral,” are full of policy-laden
substantive text. Historically, this content can be described as “postliberal.” Second, the sheer normative force of the creation process, and
its status as the main source and cause of substantive content, impacts the
way we interpret that substantive content in the first place. In other words,
because the substantive content of these constitutions reflects a deliberate
attempt to mold the way society will function and develop, the text itself
acquires a teleological character. When this happens, the model of
interpretation used must give an active role to purpose and intent. Original
explication accounts for that role.
Accordingly, we must analyze the role of substantive content in the
interpretation and application of these types of teleological constitutions.
In these instances, because the why is as important as the what in terms of
the actual text, which is explicitly designed to achieve policy objectives,
the explication of the words—which tends to allow for further
explanation, development, and elaboration—can actually facilitate the
obtainment of those goals. In other words, teleological constitutions,
because of their substantive content, need courts to focus on their texts,
their purposes and the intent of those who adopted them. It is very
difficult, not to say impossible, to ignore intent when interpreting and
applying most, if not all, teleological constitutions. In that sense, original
explication links process with substance.
IV. THE INNER WORKINGS OF THE ORIGINAL EXPLICATION MODEL
Original explication encompasses two important elements: (1) the
general social process that originated the constitution-making process,
and (2) the particular creation process itself. After taking into account the
former, original explication then focuses on the official record of the
constitution-making body. As stated, this is due to the fact that the social
process that gave birth to the constitutional project places its legitimacy
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on the constitution-making body itself.11 As such, interpreters must look
there to find the ultimate source of constitutional authority and meaning.
Methodologically, original explication uses the official records of the
constitution-making body as either the authoritative source of
constitutional meaning or, at least, the best evidence of it. As a result, the
words uttered during the deliberations of the constitutional framers are
given legal status and are treated as authoritative legal texts. As such, they
are the object of interpretation, almost like the constitutional text itself. In
particular, interpreters look for utterances that indicate intent, purpose,
design, goals, elaboration, explanation, application, and clarification as to
meaning, scope, and effect. In the end, the framers themselves become
the primary interpreters of the constitutional text, and courts are tasked
with (1) interpreting that interpretation, and (2) interpreting the
constitutional text when the framers have not offered their own
interpretation, or it is insufficient to solve a particular legal question.12
Here, the constitutional text is the beginning of the analysis, but it is
neither the end of the interpretive process nor its most important feature.
The constitutional text is always subject to the explication of the framers,
who may address issues ranging from semantic meaning to prospective
application. As we will see, most, though not all, constitutions created
through this process tend to generate substantive text. And, precisely
because of the substantive nature of the constitution itself, purpose will be
a vital tool of interpretation, construction, and adjudication. In other
words, highly democratic processes of constitutional creation tend to
privilege purpose as the main driving force of the text. As such, this
requires a model of interpretation that privileges the original purposes of
the framers as expressed during the deliberations of the framing body.
As we saw, original explication is inherently linked with a
transcendental, comprehensive, democratic, and popularly engaged
process of constitutional creation. The public nature of its creation is one

11. Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 150.
12. In that sense, original explication has its own form of the contribution thesis.
According to its proponents, “[t]he contribution thesis holds that the Constitution’s meaning
contributes to the content of constitutional law.” Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular
Constitutionalism?: Theoretical Problems and Practical Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
253, 263 (2011). In other words, the communicative content of the constitutional text must
“contribute” to or guide its legal effect. In particular, interpreters must make sure that the legal
effect given to a constitutional provision doesn’t contradict its communicative content. In the
context of the model discussed in this Article, the final construction given to the text must also
never contradict the explication of the framers. As a result, not only must the normative content
adopted by future interpreters be consistent with the constitutional text, it must also be consistent
with the framers’ interpretation of the text.
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of its main defining features and sources of legitimacy. Without a visible
and public process of constitutional creation, original explication loses
much, although not all, of its normative power. In that sense, original
explication is better suited for modern state constitutions that were created
by socially transcendental and highly democratic constitutional
processes.13
The contrast between the process of adoption in the context of some
state constitutions and the federal Constitution is striking. While
Philadelphia was a secret meeting, many modern state conventions were
highly public and transparent. Also, the Convention in Philadelphia was
not elected for the purpose of adopting a new constitution, nor did its
individual delegates go before the People to acquire a mandate as to
particular policy positions. In contrast, many modern state conventions
were directly elected for the stated purpose of drafting a new constitution
and after an electoral campaign where the substantive issues as to the
content of the new constitution was waged.14 While the Convention in
Philadelphia was a meeting of representatives of the country’s elite and
wealthy, many modern state conventions reflect the real social
composition of their population. While the Philadelphia Convention did
not articulate a process for outside participation, many modern state
constitutions allowed for public opinion to directly influence the drafting
processes, not just their ratification.
As previewed, original explication focuses on what the constitutional
framers said and did during the formal deliberations of the constitutionmaking process. This includes references to reasons, intent, purposes,
goals, scope, and even possible applications of the constitutional text that
is being adopted. Also, explication includes explanations related to the
semantic and legal meaning of words.
Let’s turn first to the issue of communicative meaning. For example,
if a particular word or set of words has a settled linguistic meaning, but
the framers publicly state that said word or set of words will have a
somewhat different meaning, the latter trumps the former. It can also shed
light on the underlying factual premises that led the framers to adopt a
particular constitutional provision. This could help interpreters later on

13. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1028 (1984); Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”: AbducedPrinciple Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently
Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 940 (2009).
14. See, e.g., G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Getting from Here to There:
Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 36
RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1080 (2005).
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in order to avoid both anachronistic adjudication and charges of judicial
usurpation.
There is an open question, however, as to the extent of explication in
terms of the meaning of constitutional provisions. On the one hand, there
is explication as meaning. That is, the statements, explanations, and
elaborations made by the framers during the constitution-making process
are the meaning of the words of the constitution. In other words, the
framers’ intent is not evidence of meaning but the meaning itself. A lesser
version of this approach is that the original explication of the framers is
the best evidence of meaning. As a result, there is some theoretical space
between the explication and the actual meaning of the words. This would
allow the use of additional evidences of meaning when carrying out both
communicative interpretation and legal construction. Yet, as a practical
matter, the authoritative nature of the explication, and the empirical
richness that normally accompanies it, limits the gap to the point of virtual
irrelevance. In the end, both alternatives are consistent with the original
explication model.
As to the substantive and normative content of the text, original
explication also has an important role to play. For example, the issues of
intent and purpose have several manifestations and implications. First,
the issue of the reasons or purposes that drove the framers to adopt a
particular word or set of words—or why they did what they did. Second,
the objectives or goals that motivated the framers—or what they were
trying to achieve. Third, the understandings of the framers—or their
linguistic and legal assumptions that impact the meaning of the adopted
text. And finally, the purposes and goals of the constitutional project
itself—or in addition to the goals the framers publicly expressed they were
trying to achieve, what is the goal of the Constitution as adopted and
contextualized by original explication.
Therefore, if a constitution’s content is full of substantive policy
preferences that were adopted as the direct product of a result-oriented
process, then the intent, purpose, and goals of the framers must be taken
into account, precisely because it is there that we will find the source and
content of that substance. If the text of a constitution can be characterized
as inherently or substantively teleological in nature, then we must
privilege the sources that will yield that content. And in the context of the
particular process of creation that has been discussed so far, only original
explication can adequately deal with process and substance at the same
time.
Finally, an obvious question comes to mind when analyzing the
concept of original explication: how is it different from the other intentbased methodologies currently used in the United States, particularly
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original intent, original public meaning, and the subjective teleological
model? Original explication is partially a combination of these
approaches and also a separate and distinct model of interpretation. I now
turn to a contrast between original explication and its other intent-based
counterparts of constitutional interpretation, so we can better appreciate
its form and understand its differences with these alternatives.15
A. Original Intent
Original intent focuses on what the framers attempted or wanted to
do when they enacted the constitutional text.16 In other words, it tries to
identify what they were trying to communicate through the text. This
refers to both communicative and normative content. This would also
include, for example, the original expected applications of the framers.
This means that when interpreting or applying a particular constitutional
provision, we should analyze how the authors would interpret it or apply
it.
In its weakest form, original intent only treats the authors’ views as
to the communicative meaning and legal effect of their words as
authoritative. Since the text is merely the articulation of the authors’
thoughts, it is imperative to know what the authors thought the text they
adopted meant. In its strongest form, original intent treats the authors’
views as to how the text should be applied in a particular case or
controversy as authoritative as well. This responds to the view that a legal
text should only be applied consistently with its authors’ views. Needless
to say, this latter articulation of the original intent model can be very
speculative, particularly with controversies that were never analyzed or
contemplated by the framers.
The main difference between original explication and the model of
original intent is the way in which intent is articulated. Intent can be
inward, private, and unknown to others; explication is always external,
public, and shared. Also, intent can be informal and unofficial, while
explication is always formal and official.
This, for example, has a direct effect on the issue of sources. While
some versions of original intent allow for private conversations,

15. For a more in-depth analysis of these models and how they contrast with each other,
see Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 9.
16. See generally Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some
Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001 (1991); Richard S. Kay, The Adherence to the Original
Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV.
226 (1988); Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST.
COMMENT. 77 (1988); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
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correspondence, and other writings to be used to ascertain an individual’s
intent, as well as publicly expressed intent made outside the formal
constitutional-creation process, explication is limited to the publicly made
statements and actions of the constitutional legislator while acting in that
capacity. This is so because political authority and legitimacy is given by
the process, not by the individual. As such, only the publicly made
statements made during deliberations are authoritative. Other statements,
whether private or made publicly but outside the constitutional
deliberations, are given only persuasive, contextual, or secondary weight.
Furthermore, intent has the problem of abstraction and a level of
generality. This is so because it is sometimes up to the interpreter to
ascertain that intent, especially when it was not articulated by the framers.
In that sense, ascertaining intent becomes an exercise in reverse
engineering or deduction. In the original explication model, the formality
of the statements made by the framers allows interpreters to address them
as they would any other legal text. After all, the explications of the
framers are laid out in formal and official documents—mostly transcripts
of the deliberations of the constitution-making body; in other words, they
become text and, thus, are subject to interpretation.
Yet, because of the nature and structure of that text, the problem of
under-determinacy17 is less as compared to the formal constitutional text.
This is due to the fact that constitution makers tend to be terser in terms
of the selection of words for the formal constitutional text in order to make
it practical and accessible, while they have a much freer hand in
elaborating during the deliberations of the constitutional body. An
example of this is Puerto Rico, where the Constitution is relatively short,
but is accompanied by more than 2,500 pages of explication. In other
words, short constitutional provisions tend to generate more underdeterminacy than longer and detail-rich explications. Under-determinacy
is still present, but considerably reduced.
B. Original Public Meaning
Original public meaning focuses on what the general public thought
the constitutional text meant at the time of its adoption.18 While there
17. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987). Under-determinacy occurs when the communicative content of
the text does not provide sufficient normative content to solve a particular legal issue.
18. See generally Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 31
CONST. COMMENT. 71 (2016); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive
Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 15 GEO. L.J. 1765 (1997); James E.
Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 433 (2013); Richard
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seems to be some doubt about whether this is limited to communicative
meaning, or if it also extends to legal or normative meaning,19 there is
agreement that the only binding source is the text itself. And because the
text needs to be accepted by the public in order to become the constitution,
the authoritative source of constitutional meaning is the understanding of
the general public at the time.
In this model, the authors’ role is limited to enacting the text. As a
result, “the authors lack either legitimacy or authority as to the meaning
and effects of the text they adopted beyond the act of adoption itself.”20 It
would appear that original public meaning privileges two important
elements: authority and publicity. The main problem with original public
meaning is that most, if not all, of its normative claims are specifically and
exclusively designed for the U.S. Constitution, which was written in secret
(as opposed to publicly) and in which the Framers did not have the power
to adopt the text, only to suggest it to the ratifying public (thus lacking
authority).
Original public meaning is definitely not suited for the type of
constitution-making process analyzed in this Article. As I have argued, in
democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially transcendental
processes of creation, the line between framers and the general public
blurs significantly. As a result, there is no real distinction between the
authors’ intent and public meaning.
Original intent and original public meaning have many differences
and similarities. In terms of original explication, these differences and
similarities are almost irrelevant. This is because original explication
encompasses both intent and public meaning.
In the original explication model, because of the public nature of the
constitution-making process, the explication becomes the public meaning
of the words. In other words, by exteriorizing and publicizing their
explication, the public is aware that the meaning of a particular word or
set of words, as used in the constitution, is what the framers explained it
to mean. For example, if the framers publicly state their understanding of
what “cruel” or “imminent” or “reasonable” means, the public meaning of

S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 703 (2009); James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics &
Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F.
21 (2016).
19. Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J.
569, 586–91 (1998).
20. Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 9, at 250 (emphasis in original).
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those words in the constitutional context is the meaning given by the
framers.
Another important difference between the original explication model
and original public meaning originalism is the effect it has on the
interpretation-construction distinction. Originalists in the United States
have a theory of interpretation, not construction.21 As such, originalism
primarily focuses on the analysis of the communicative content of the
constitutional text, leaving as a separate issue the matter of giving legal
effect to that content, particularly in situations where the communicative
content is under-determinate as to constitutional doctrine.
In the case of original explication, while there is room to distinguish
between interpretation and construction, explication affects both. This is
because explication privileges both the communicative meaning the
framers gave to the words they were adopting, as well as the legal effects
they wanted them to have. As such, original explication is both a theory
of interpretation and of construction. In that case, the legal effect the
framers gave to a particular provision can actually contradict the semantic
meaning of the words. This would negate the contribution thesis in a
certain way, although this too can be reconciled by stating that the
semantic meaning of the words is what the framers explicated. Thus,
when an apparent contradiction emerges between semantic meaning and
the framers’ statements as to its legal effects, we can either say that
explication trumps semantic meaning, or that it alters it, thus eliminating
the contradiction. In other words, the framers’ explication as to legal
effect also impacts the semantic meaning in the first place.
C. Subjective Teleological Model
The subjective teleological model is very similar to the original intent
approach. It is also similar to original explication. It seems to serve as a
bridge between both of them. The subjective teleological approach turns
to the framers instead of just the text—thus subjective instead of
objective—and it focuses on the purposes that animated or motivated the
framers—thus teleological.22

21. “It is important to keep in mind that originalism is warranted as a theory of
interpretation—that is, as a method for determining the meaning of the words written in the
Constitution.” Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 101, 108 (2001); see also Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of
Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2015).
22. See András Jakab, Judicial Reasoning in Constitutional Courts: An European
Perspective, 14 GERMAN L.J. 1215 (2013); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From
Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006).
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But unlike original intent or original explication, the subjective
teleological model limits its inquiry to purpose, potentially leaving out
other issues related to intent, such as semantic meaning, scope, and
application. Therefore, it seems that the subjective teleological model is
a narrower version of the original intent approach.
But in the specific case of teleological constitution, the gap between
original explication and the subjective teleological model narrows
considerably because, since purpose is the driving force behind the
constitutional project, purpose will play a prominent role in the
explication given by the framers. While original explication does not limit
itself to purpose, the latter is front and center in teleological systems
because of the substantive nature of the constitutional text and structure.
Since the framers drafted a teleological constitution with stated policy
goals, the subjective intent of the framers in terms of purpose, as
articulated in their explications, becomes the main ingredient of
constitutional interpretation and construction.
But the case for original explication seems stronger in teleological
constitutions than the one in favor of the subjective teleological model,
precisely because the former is considerably more comprehensive as to
the tools it provides and the constraint it creates. This is particularly true
in situations where those teleological constitutions were the product of
highly democratic, public, popular, participatory, and socially
transcendental processes of creation. In these situations, there are two
elements that should be taken into account. First, the normative force
generated by the creation process. Second, the teleological nature of the
constitution. As such, both must be taken into account, and the subjective
teleological model focuses too much on the latter and too little on the
former. The original explication model accounts for both, privileging the
purposes stated in the explications, but also focusing on other intentrelated statements and elaborations.
D. Original Methods
This model states that “the constitutional text should be interpreted
using the tools the framers themselves used in the process of constitutional
interpretation, and thus . . . believe would be used by later interpreters.”23
As such, this model does not have inherent normative or substantive
content, since it will vary depending on the particular constitution and the
23. Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 9, at 261. See also John O. McGinnis & Michael
Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
371 (2008); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods of Originalism: A
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751
(2009).
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views of its framers as to the prevailing methods of interpretation. This
model proposes that the correct method of interpretation is the one the
framers thought would be used. The reasoning behind this model is that
an author will take into account what he or she believes will be done by
interpreters. That belief necessarily requires identifying the prevailing
methods of interpretation at the time the framers adopted the constitution.
The main difference between this model and original explication is
normative. The correct method of interpretation does not respond to the
authors’ views about hermeneutics, but to the normative force generated
by the constitution-making process itself. In other words, it is the process,
not the views of the framers as to interpretation, which will command the
appropriate interpretive methodology. Of course, it may be that said
process will take us back to the framers’ wishes as to hermeneutics, but it
is the result of a different normative path. The original methods model
treats the framers’ views on interpretation as authoritative as a starting
point. Original explication starts with the process, and depending on the
normative force it generates, then may turn to the framers, not because the
framers wanted it so, but because the process of creation requires that
approach.
V. ORIGINAL EXPLICATION AND MODERN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
As we just saw, there are two key elements that relate to our current
analysis. First, the content of the constitution—modern teleological state
constitutions, which tend to include a whole array of policy-laden
provisions, particularly in the realm of individual and collective rights, as
well as to matters related to economic organization, social structure,
environmental protection, labor relations, and cultural diversity.24
Second, the process that created the constitution itself—highly
democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially transcendental
processes that, as a result, gave tremendous authority and legitimacy to
the persons and bodies charged with constitutional drafting.
While not inherent to them, post-liberal teleological constitutions
tend to be, as a historical matter, the result of these types of social
processes, from social reform movements in Puerto Rico, mobilized
indigenous majorities in Bolivia, or a transition from apartheid in South
Africa. The same can be said about successful democratic and civic
movements in various U.S. states during the twentieth century. The
content of these constitutions is highly teleological and post-liberal, and
24. See generally Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, Looking Beyond the Negative-Positive
Rights Distinction: Analyzing Constitutional Rights According to their Nature, Effect and
Reach, 41 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 31 (2018).
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the process of their creation can be characterized as transcendental,
historical, and social moments in the life of the political community.
As a result, original explication interacts with modern teleological
constitutions in two ways. First, it fits neatly with the process of creation
by adequately taking into account the will of the constitution-creating
body when it comes to interpreting and implementing the constitutional
content. It seems that some sort of originalist approach may be required
when the constitution was the result of a highly democratic and
transcendental constitution-making process. Taking the framers out of the
picture would seem awkward and even illegitimate. Second, original
explication allows for the maximum use of the teleological nature of these
types of constitutions by adequately taking into account intent, purpose,
and history—elements which are inherently linked to the substantive
content of teleological constitutions.
Unlike the other originalist approaches, original explication
appropriately combines both the issues of process and substance, while
maintaining a normative base of justification that allows for future events
to require its abandonment. In other words, original explication is the only
model that adequately acknowledges the importance of the constitutionmaking body as the source of constitutional meaning (process) and the
importance of the actual content of the text itself (substance). It is also
designed to take into account future procedural and substantive
developments that could require a course correction as to methodology.
Too much focus on intent outside the constitution-making process—
for example, focusing on private correspondence over official statements
made during the constitutional assembly—would negate the importance
of the process of creation itself as the main legitimizing factor of the
constitutional project. As such, original explication works better than
original intent by focusing on the formal and official statements made
during creation, as well as its accompanying historical context. The same
would be true as it relates to the subjective teleological model, which
would seem too narrow and insufficient.
Precisely because the type of creation process discussed in this
Article tends to generate constitutions that are full of substantive content,
greater emphasis should be given to non-textual sources. In other words,
since the text itself and the structure of the constitution are teleological in
nature, thus an explicit part of the constitutional project, the text becomes
part of the why. Original explication unites process and substance, taking
into account that in these circumstances, process creates substance and
substance is a reflection of process. In both instances, the process of
adoption becomes one of the central aspects, if not the central aspect, of
the constitutional project itself.
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As a historical matter, modern teleological constitutions tend to be of
a progressive bent. As such, the use of an original explication approach
tends to produce broad and progressive results. In other words, the
explication can—although not always—generate a self-updating text,
because the framers themselves precisely explained their broad and
progressive intent. In some instances, this could even empower courts to
go beyond the specific intent of the framers, as they have manifested their
wish that the broadest interpretation and construction be given to their
words, in case they fail to take into account future developments. When
true, this would totally obliterate the originalism-as-narrow and livingconstitutionalist-as-broad dichotomy, because the original explication of
the framers can either require a living constitutionalist approach or be
such that it produces the broad approach to constitutional adjudication.
Additionally, original explication may reveal the underlying factual
premises that guided the framers. Thus, courts are better equipped to deal
with the issue of changing circumstances, while maintaining fidelity with
the original constitutional project and the will of its framers.
VI. ORIGINAL EXPLICATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Original explication can constitute a breakthrough in modern
constitutional theory because it is an interpretive method that combines
the transcendental process component of teleological constitutions with
its substantive content. As such, it can eliminate much of the underenforcement problems that some of these systems, particularly U.S. states,
have faced because some courts still cling to interpretive models that fail
to take into account these two elements.
Of course, interpretive methods are only one side of the coin. The
other side is the need for courts to accept the new roles assigned to them
by constitution makers in teleological systems, which includes judicial
intervention into policy areas. Teleological state constitutions represent a
direct challenge to classic concepts of the judicial role in general and how
courts apply constitutional provisions in particular. Modern teleological
constitutions have considerably broadened the catalogue of issues,
arguments, types of controversies, and choices of remedies facing courts.
As such, current models of judicial enforcement of constitutional
provisions are ill-suited for the application of substantive policy
provisions. New methods are needed.25

25. See generally Ackerman, supra note 13, at 1044; Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós,
Constitutionally Required Judicial Activism: Re-Examining the Role of Courts in Modern
Constitutional Adjudication, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 36 (2018).
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For example, the court-as-primarily-a-negative-legislator view has
been both transformed and destroyed: (1) transformed because the content
of the substantive protections, even in negative rights cases, will often
require courts to intervene in a whole host of public policy issues where
the constitution has taken a position, from labor rights to economic
organization; and (2) destroyed because they have added a wide array of
issues which transcend the mere implementation of negative rights and
provisions, ranging from positive rights against private parties to deeper
intervention in policy matters where they must implement the framers’
designs over the wishes of current ordinary politics. The list seems
endless: positive horizontal rights articulated as rules, negative vertical
rights articulated as principles, specific policy provisions, and so on.
Modern state constitutions that are teleological in nature offer a
challenge to state courts, and original explication constitutes an
interpretive alternative that can adequately take into account both the
process of creation and the substantive content of these constitutions, thus
allowing courts to enforce these constitutions as they were designed to be,
thus strengthening democratic self-governance through judicial action and
intervention. Quite the revolution indeed. As we’ve seen in these cases,
original explication is both a normative obligation and a helpful tool.
Many modern state constitutions are under enforced, particularly
when it comes to their substantive policy provisions.26 One of the reasons
for this problem is that many state court judges take too many
methodological pages from the Supreme Court of the United States, which
interprets the federal Constitution. As such, state courts fall into several
traps.
First, the reasons for using or discarding a particular model of
interpretation will differ when analyzing a modern state constitution, as
opposed to the older federal text. This creates the risk of discarding
adoption history-based models of interpretation for reasons that are only,
or at least mainly, applicable to the U.S. Constitution. The normative and
empirical justifications for using those models in the state context remain
present despite their lack of applicability in the federal context.
Second, the effects of using a particular intent or adoption historybased model of interpretation are considerably different in the state
context. For example, state constitutions, as compared to their federal
counterpart, tend to include substantive policy matters. When this is
combined with intent or adoption history-based models of interpretation,
the end results would be different from what normally occurs in federal
26. See Elizabeth Pascal, Welfare Rights in State Constitutions, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 871
(2008).
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courts. As such, courts should take a closer and deeper look into how
these interpretive models would aid in the development of state
constitutional law.
Third, the current models of interpretation used, or discussed, in the
United States are premised on the structure, framework, and content of
the federal Constitution. Yet many modern state constitutions have a
whole array of provisions that simply have no remotely similar
counterpart in the federal text. Therefore, there is a normative and
methodological gap that risks deepening state constitutional underenforcement.
Also, the arsenal of tools available to state courts in modern
teleological systems is varied. The first tool is the use of reasonableness
tests in order to ascertain the government’s—or a private party’s—duty in
the context of the enforcement of positive rights. Second is the
comprehensive use of the negative legislator role in situations where there
are policy rules which control legislative and executive discretion. Third
is the effective use of the injunctive and mandamus powers. Fourth is the
expansion of rights protection as required by the specific rule-broad
language combination. Fifth is the development of new remedial
measures and writs that adequately take into account the substantive
content of teleological constitutions. The use of these tools is particularly
adequate if the original explication actually supports it.
CONCLUSION
Modern teleological state constitutions that are the result of
transcendental social processes pose a challenge in terms of interpretive
methodologies and models of construction and adjudication. Current
models are insufficient to guarantee their adequate enforcement,
particularly in terms of putting into effect their substantive policy content.
Furthermore, because of the ideological connotations of these types
of constitutions, the issue of continued allegiance, fidelity, and connection
between the current political community and the original constitutional
project is crucial. As such, when the original project still holds, some sort
of intent or adoption history-based approach is warranted. More
importantly, when the process of constitutional creation constitutes a vital
aspect of the political community, the role of the framers is augmented.
Hence, original explication, which takes into account both the teleological
content of these constitutions and their highly dynamic and democratic
process of creation.
Original explication is a starting point, not an endgame. Its own
normative basis requires a constant analysis of the level of legitimacy,
authority, and fidelity enjoyed by the constitutional project. This includes
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measuring these factors over time, for a process that once enjoyed them
may lose them in the future. Original explication only works when the
original process still commands legitimacy and authority. Continued
fidelity to the process and its substantive product will be needed for the
model to endure. If, in fact, the original process, because of its
democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially transcendental
character, still commands legitimacy and authority, I believe that original
explication is the required method of constitutional interpretation,
construction, and adjudication, at least until another similar process comes
along. In the end, time will tell if what we said then is what we want now.

